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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
---------- 
 
SAROKIN, Circuit Judge: 
 
 This case raises issues concerning the application and scope 
of the doctrine of judicial estoppel.  The district court, upon 
recommendation of a United States Magistrate Judge, granted 
summary judgment in favor of defendants on the theory that 
plaintiff, having failed to disclose its claims against 
defendants as a contingent asset in its Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
proceedings, was judicially estopped from seeking to recover on 
those claims.  For the reasons that follow, we will reverse. 
I. 
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 Ryan Operations, plaintiff in this matter1, is in the 
business of constructing homes.  This action arises out of a 
commercial dispute between Ryan and the manufacturer and 
suppliers of primed Fingerjointed Ponderosa Pine wood trim that 
Ryan purchased between January 1988 and June 1991 and used in the 
construction of several thousand new homes.  Ryan purchased the 
wood trim from Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co. ("Santiam") from 
January 1988 to March 1990, and from Furman Lumber, Inc. from 
March 1990 to June 1991.  The trim was manufactured by Bright 
Wood Corporation. 
 In July 1989, Ryan began receiving complaints from 
homeowners that the paint and underlying primer were peeling off 
the Ponderosa Pine trim on their new homes.  Ryan informed 
Santiam of the problem, and Santiam suggested that Ryan switch to 
a different brand of primer.  Ryan did so, but the problems 
continued and the complaints increased.  As a result, Ryan 
instituted a consumer repair program in the fall of 1991, 
pursuant to which it has repainted and/or replaced the wood trim 
on hundreds of houses.  Ryan is currently engaged in the costly 
process of replacing the trim on Ryan homes in several states. 
 In April 1992, Ryan filed a voluntary petition for relief 
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.  In re NVR L.P., No. 92-
                                                           
1Co-plaintiff in this matter is NVR, L.P., a limited partnership 
suing on behalf of its division NVR Building Products Company.  
Through a merger or series of mergers, a corporation entitled 
NVR, Inc. has become the successor in interest of NVR, L.P. and 
the parent corporation of NVR Homes, Inc.  NVR Homes, Inc., also 
through a merger, has become the successor in interest of Ryan 
Operations.  For simplicity's sake, we will refer to plaintiffs 
in this matter simply as "Ryan" or "plaintiff." 
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11704-T (Bankr. E.D. Va. Apr. 6, 1992).  The following month it 
filed its Schedule of Assets and Liabilities and Statement of 
Financial Affairs pursuant to Bankruptcy Code § 521.  Although 
the Code requires the debtor to disclose all claims and causes of 
actions as contingent assets, Ryan did not mention any potential 
claims that it might have from the allegedly defective Ponderosa 
Pine trim.   
 In June 1992, the bankruptcy court entered an order 
authorizing Ryan to retain counsel to represent Ryan in lawsuits 
by and against it in the ordinary course of business.  Among the 
"Routine Claims" that Ryan listed for the bankruptcy court were a 
class of "homeowners claims," nonspecifically defined as claims 
"by or against contractors or suppliers or relating to or arising 
out of the provision of services or material to the Debtors." 
App. 189-90.  The court authorized Ryan to pursue and/or defend 
itself against such claims. 
 Subsequently, in December 1992, while the bankruptcy 
proceeding was still pending, Ryan filed suit in district court 
against Bright Wood, Santiam and Furman Lumber, alleging various 
breach of warranty claims arising out of the sale and manufacture 
of the Ponderosa Pine trim and seeking to recover the costs 
incurred in its consumer repair program. 
 In July 1993, without ever having been specifically informed 
of the pending lawsuit or the potential for recovery, the 
bankruptcy court confirmed Ryan's reorganization plan.  Ryan 
emerged from bankruptcy the following month.   
6 
 In September 1994, defendant Bright Wood moved for summary 
judgment on judicial estoppel grounds, arguing that Ryan's 
failure to inform the bankruptcy court of its warranty claims 
against Bright Wood precluded Ryan from pursuing those claims in 
the district court.  Santiam, Furman, and the third-party 
defendants (who manufactured the primers used on the wood trim) 
joined in Bright Wood's motion.  Upon recommendation of a United 
States Magistrate Judge, the district court granted summary 
judgment against Ryan on March 21, 1995, on the ground of 
judicial estoppel alone.  From that ruling, Ryan appeals. 
II. 
 The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§1332(a)(1).  We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291. 
III. 
 We exercise plenary review over the district court's order 
granting summary judgment.  Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 
1137, 1141 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 165 (1995).   
IV. 
 Judicial estoppel, sometimes called the "doctrine against 
the assertion of inconsistent positions," is a judge-made 
doctrine that seeks to prevent a litigant from asserting a 
position inconsistent with one that she has previously asserted 
in the same or in a previous proceeding.  It is not intended to 
eliminate all inconsistencies, however slight or inadvertent; 
rather, it is designed to prevent litigants from "playing 'fast 
and loose with the courts.'"  Scarano v. Central R. Co. of New 
7 
Jersey, 203 F.2d 510, 513 (3d Cir. 1953)(citation omitted).  "The 
basic principle . . . is that absent any good explanation, a 
party should not be allowed to gain an advantage by litigation on 
one theory, and then seek an inconsistent advantage by pursuing 
an incompatible theory."  18 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller 
& Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4477 (1981), 
p.782. 
 Ryan raises four issues regarding the scope and application 
of judicial estoppel for our review: (1) whether the district 
court erred in applying judicial estoppel at the request of one 
who was neither a party to the prior proceeding nor in privity 
with a party to that proceeding; (2) whether the district court 
erred in applying judicial estoppel because Ryan derived no 
benefit from its failure to disclose these potential claims in 
the bankruptcy proceedings; (3) whether the district court erred 
in concluding that Ryan's position in this lawsuit is 
inconsistent with a position it took in the bankruptcy 
proceedings; and (4) whether the application of judicial estoppel 
in this case is inconsistent with principles of equity and 
justice.  We will examine each in turn.  
V. 
 Both parties agree that federal law should govern our 
disposition of this case, and we accept their agreement.2  Having 
                                                           
2Judge Sarokin, the author of this opinion, would not accept the 
agreement of the parties as to whether federal or state law 
governs in this case, because he believes that the question must 
be analyzed under the doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 
U.S. 64 (1938), and that the parties cannot stipulate as to the 
applicable law as they might in a choice-of-law situation.  The 
8 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
following comments are the opinion of Judge Sarokin, not the 
court:  It is well established that federal courts sitting in 
diversity must generally apply state substantive law and federal 
procedural law.  Erie, 304 U.S. 64.  This doctrine is rooted in 
the Constitution; the Supreme Court reasoned that "declar[ing] 
substantive rules of common law" in diversity cases is "'an 
unconstitutional assumption of powers by courts of the United 
States.'"  Erie, 304 U.S. at 78, 79; see also Charles A. Wright, 
Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, 19 Federal Practice and 
Procedure § 4505.  Because the question of whether federal or 
state law should govern issues of judicial estoppel in diversity 
cases is a question of the constitutional powers of the federal 
courts, we cannot simply accept the parties' recommendation that 
federal law governs without first ensuring that applying federal 
law would be constitutional under the circumstances.  We can 
ensure that the application of federal law is constitutional in 
one of two ways: (1) by determining, as I would, that the Erie 
doctrine does not apply; or (2) by determining under Erie that 
the law of judicial estoppel is procedural rather than 
substantive in nature.    
 Although I believe that judicial estoppel is substantive in 
nature, I am persuaded by the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit in 
Edwards v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 690 F.2d 595, 598 n.4 (6th Cir. 
1982), and the Fourth Circuit in Allen v. Zurich Ins. Co., 667 
F.2d 1162, 1167 n.4 (4th Cir. 1982), that Erie does not require 
us to apply state law.  The Erie doctrine is not absolute; 
exceptions can be made where, as here, there are "affirmative 
countervailing considerations" that implicate "strong federal 
policy" considerations.  Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. 
Cooperative, Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 537-38 (1958); see also AFN, 
Inc. v. Schlott, Inc., 798 F. Supp. 219 (D.N.J. 1992).  A federal 
court's ability to protect itself from manipulation by litigants 
should not vary according to the law of the state in which the 
underlying dispute arose.  I would therefore conclude that a 
federal court sitting in diversity must apply federal law to 
questions regarding the doctrine of judicial estoppel.  
 There is an additional reason why I think it important to 
reach this matter.  This court has never addressed this issue 
directly.  While we have tended in the past to rely on federal 
law of judicial estoppel in diversity cases, we have occasionally 
applied state law or a combination of state and federal law. 
Compare Scarano, 203 F.2d 510 (applying federal law) with Linan-
Faye Construction Co. v. Housing Auth. of Camden, 49 F.3d 915 (3d 
Cir. 1995)(applying New Jersey law) and with Gleason v. United 
States, 458 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1972)(applying both federal and 
state law).  In some cases, there may be no relevant difference 
in terms of result between federal and state law of judicial 
estoppel.  In other cases, however, the decision as to which law 
to apply may be dispositive of the outcome.  As a result, I 
believe that we should take this opportunity to clarify the law 
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determined that federal law controls, we turn to the first issue 
presented for our review: whether the doctrine of judicial 
estoppel is available only to those who were parties or in 
privity with a party to the prior proceeding.  Ryan argues that 
the doctrine as expounded in this circuit has a privity 
requirement which prevents its being enforced by "strangers to 
the earlier litigation."  Appellant's Br. at 29.  As it is 
undisputed that none of the defendants in the instant action was 
a party to the bankruptcy proceeding, Ryan contends that the 
district court erred in applying judicial estoppel for their 
benefit. 
 We first articulated the doctrine of judicial estoppel in 
the seminal case of Scarano v. Central R. Co. of New Jersey, 203 
F.2d 510 (3d Cir. 1953).  The plaintiff in that case, following a 
work-related injury, sought damages from his employer on the 
ground that he was completely incapacitated.  After winning a 
damages award, he proceeded to sue his employer for reinstatement 
under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement.  We 
concluded that plaintiff was estopped from seeking reinstatement, 
explaining our reasoning as follows: 
The 'estoppel' of which, for want of a more precise 
word, we here speak is but a particular limited 
application of what is sometimes said to be a general 
rule that "a party to litigation will not be permitted 
to assume inconsistent or mutually contradictory 
positions with respect to the same matter in the same 
or a successive series of suits." 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
of the circuit, especially since this issue has been properly 
briefed and presented to us. 
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Id. at 512-13.  We expressly declined to decide "[w]hether the 
correct doctrine is that broad," however; instead, we stated that 
the  
rule we apply here need be and is no broader than this. 
A plaintiff who has obtained relief from an adversary 
by asserting and offering proof to support one position 
may not be heard later in the same court to contradict 
himself in an effort to establish against the same 
adversary a second claim inconsistent with his earlier 
contention. 
 
Id. at 513 (emphasis added).   
 Ryan argues that the language underlined above indicates our 
intention to instill a privity requirement into our newly 
articulated doctrine of judicial estoppel.  The above excerpts 
make clear, however, that we did not hold that the doctrine was 
limited to circumstances in which a party asserted incompatible 
positions against the same adversary.  On the contrary, we 
explicitly stated that we so articulated the rule because the 
facts of the case did not require us to determine whether a 
broader rule might apply in other circumstances.   
 Ryan correctly points out that we have never applied the 
doctrine of judicial estoppel for the benefit of parties who were 
not involved in the prior judicial proceeding.  See, e.g. 
Scarano, 203 F.2d 510; Oneida Motor Freight, Inc. v. United 
Jersey Bank, 848 F.2d 414 (3d Cir.)(holding that plaintiff is 
judicially estopped from asserting position in post-bankruptcy 
proceeding against a bankruptcy creditor that is inconsistent 
with position asserted in prior bankruptcy proceeding), cert. 
denied, 488 U.S. 967 (1988); Fleck v. KDI Sylvan Pools, Inc., 981 
11 
F.2d 107 (3d Cir. 1992)(holding that plaintiffs who promised 
bankruptcy court they would not seek recovery against debtor in 
excess of insurance coverage are judicially estopped from 
subsequently attempting to do so), cert. denied sub nom Doughboy 
Recreational, Inc., Div. of Hoffinger Indus., Inc. v. Fleck, 507 
U.S. 1005 (1993); Delgrosso v. Spang & Co., 903 F.2d 234 (3d Cir. 
1990).  However, we have never expressly limited the doctrine's 
applicability to situations in which a litigant asserts an 
inconsistent position against the same party or its privy.  
 The absence of an express rule notwithstanding, plaintiff 
argues that language in Gleason v. United States, 458 F.2d 171 
(3d Cir. 1972), reveals that privity is required.  The plaintiff 
in that case filed a Workers' Compensation petition following his 
exposure to radioactive material in a work-related accident, 
alleging prospectively that he had suffered injury.  When injury 
from the radiation actually materialized four years later, 
plaintiff sued his employer for damages.  Although plaintiff 
testified in deposition that he had not actually experienced an 
injury at the time of the Workers' Compensation petition, the 
trial court dismissed the case on statute of limitations grounds, 
reasoning that plaintiff's Workers' Compensation petition 
indicated that he knew about the injury well within the 
limitations period.  On plaintiff's appeal, the employer argued 
that plaintiff should be judicially estopped from relying on 
deposition testimony which directly contradicted his Workers' 
Compensation petition.   
12 
 In reaching our conclusion that judicial estoppel was 
inappropriate under the circumstances, we noted that the doctrine 
of judicial estoppel "has not always been applied, but has 
usually been applied where the same parties are involved and 
where one of the parties has changed his position or given 
something of value relying on the statement of his opponent." Id. 
at 175.  Ryan now argues that this language evidences a rule that 
privity is required for the application of judicial estoppel.  We 
disagree, for two reasons.  First, we neither stated a rule in 
Gleason that these equitable characteristics were requirements 
for the application of judicial estoppel nor rested our decision 
on that basis.  Rather, our decision rested on our conclusion 
that the plaintiff "did not play fast and loose with the courts 
or with the defendants."  458 F.2d 176.  Second, although Gleason 
did not attempt to distinguish between equitable estoppel and 
judicial estoppel, we have since emphasized the importance of 
that distinction and more clearly articulated the border between 
the two doctrines.  See Oneida, 848 F.2d at 419. Ryan cannot now 
extrapolate legal principles from any conflation of judicial and 
equitable estoppel that may have existed prior to our 
clarification of the distinction between the two.    
 In addition, we note that the purpose of the judicial-
estoppel doctrine militates against the imposition of a privity 
requirement.  Judicial estoppel "is intended to protect the 
courts rather than the litigants."  Fleck v. KDI Sylvan Pools, 
Inc., 981 F.2d 107, 121-22 (3d Cir. 1992).  As we explained in 
Oneida, 
13 
[j]udicial estoppel looks to the connection between the 
litigant and the judicial system while equitable 
estoppel focuses on the relationship between the 
parties to the prior litigation.   
 
Oneida, 848 F.2d 414, 419 (3d Cir. 1988).  Unlike equitable 
estoppel, therefore, judicial estoppel does not require that the 
party urging estoppel demonstrate that she believed or relied 
upon the plaintiff's prior inconsistent statement.  Scarano, 203 
F.2d at 512.  While privity and/or detrimental reliance are often 
present in judicial estoppel cases, they are not required.   
 Our conclusion that privity is not required for the 
application of judicial estoppel accords with the majority view. 
See Patriot Cinemas, Inc. v. General Cinema Corp., 834 F.2d 208, 
214 (1st Cir. 1987)("harm to an opponent is not an invariable 
prerequisite to judicial estoppel"); Edwards v. Aetna Life Ins. 
Co., 690 F.2d 595, 598 (6th Cir. 1982)("judicial estoppel may be 
applied even if detrimental reliance or privity does not exist"); 
Konstantinidis v. Chen, 626 F.2d 933, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1980)(same); 
Total Petroleum, Inc. v. Davis, 822 F.2d 734, 737 n.6 (8th Cir. 
1987)(judicial estoppel does not require reliance or prejudice, 
because it seeks to protect the courts); Muellner v. Mars, Inc., 
714 F. Supp. 351, 356 (N.D. Ill. 1989). 
 There are many instances in which the assertion of 
inconsistent positions can work to the advantage of a party but 
where there is no identity or relationship between those against 
whom the claim (or defense) is asserted.  Where the contentions 
are mutually exclusive, it is irrelevant that they are asserted 
against diverse parties for the purposes of determining judicial 
14 
estoppel.  The integrity of the court is affronted by the 
inconsistency notwithstanding the lack of identity of those 
against whom it is asserted. 
 The defendants in this case thus were not barred from 
seeking judicial estoppel by the fact that they were not parties 
to Ryan's bankruptcy proceeding. 
VI. 
 We reach the same conclusion with respect to Ryan's related 
argument that "judicial estoppel should be applied only where the 
party resisting it benefited from the statement."  Appellant's 
Br. at 44.  Ryan contends that the district court erred in 
applying judicial estoppel in this case because, by Ryan's own 
estimation, Ryan did not benefit from its failure to disclose the 
instant claims in the bankruptcy court.   
 Putting aside for a moment the question of whether Ryan 
benefitted from its nondisclosure, we begin by determining 
whether as a general rule a party must have benefitted from her 
prior position in order to be judicially estopped from 
subsequently asserting an inconsistent one.  We readily conclude 
that the doctrine of judicial estoppel in this circuit contains 
no such requirement.3  We have noted on several occasions that 
"application of the doctrine of judicial estoppel is particularly 
                                                           
3We note that the Sixth and Seventh Circuits have reached the 
opposite conclusion.  See Edwards v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 690 
F.2d 595, 599 (6th Cir. 1982); Astor Chauffered Limousine Co. v. 
Runnfeldt Investment Corp., 910 F.2d 1540, 1548 (7th cir. 
1990)("The offense is not taking inconsistent positions so much 
as it is winning, twice, on the basis of incompatible 
positions."). 
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appropriate in situations . . . where the party benefitted from 
its original position."  Delgrosso v. Spang & Co., 903 F.2d 234, 
242 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 967 (1990); Murray v. 
Silberstein, 882 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1989).  In such cases, the 
tribunal has acted in reliance on the party's initial assertion, 
and thus the threat to the integrity of the judicial process from 
subsequent assertion of an incompatible position is more 
immediate.   
 Stating that benefit to the party from its prior position 
makes application of the doctrine "particularly appropriate," 
however, is not the equivalent of stating that such benefit is a 
necessary precondition to application of the doctrine.  As we 
stated in Lewandowski v. National Railroad Passenger Corp. 
(Amtrak), 882 F.2d 815 (3d Cir. 1989), "the critical issue is 
what the [party] contended in the underlying proceeding, rather 
than what the jury found."  Id. at 819.  Whether the party sought 
to be estopped benefitted from its earlier position or was 
motivated to seek such a benefit may be relevant insofar as it 
evidences an intent to play fast and loose with the courts.  It 
is not, however, an independent requirement for application of 
the doctrine of judicial estoppel.   
VII. 
 As judicial estoppel is intended to prevent parties from 
playing fast and loose with the courts by asserting inconsistent 
positions, any application of the doctrine must rest upon a 
finding that the party against whom estoppel is sought asserted a 
position inconsistent with one she previously asserted in a 
16 
judicial proceeding.  The third issue that Ryan raises on appeal 
is whether Ryan has in fact asserted inconsistent positions 
within the meaning of the judicial-estoppel doctrine.  This 
entails a two-part inquiry: (1) is Ryan's present position 
inconsistent with a position it asserted in its Chapter 11 
proceedings; and (2) if so, did Ryan assert either or both of the 
inconsistent positions in bad faith--i.e., with intent to play 
fast and loose with the court.  Only if both prongs are satisfied 
is judicial estoppel an appropriate remedy. 
 The district court found that Ryan's failure to list its 
potential claims arising from the Ponderosa Pine trim on its 
schedule of assets in the Chapter 11 proceeding constituted a 
statement that Ryan had no such claim, which the current lawsuit 
contradicts.  Ryan contends that its present claims are not 
inconsistent with any position it took in the bankruptcy 
proceeding because it neither affirmatively represented that it 
had no claim against defendants arising from the Ponderosa Pine 
Trim situation nor misled the court with regard to the existence 
and/or prosecution of those claims.   
A. 
 As a preliminary matter, we will set forth the disclosure 
requirements of the United States Bankruptcy Code in order to 
place Ryan's alleged prior inconsistent statement in context. The 
Code imposes on debtors an affirmative duty of full disclosure.  
Section 521 requires the debtor to file with the court "a 
schedule of assets and liabilities . . . and a statement of the 
debtor's financial affairs."  11 U.S.C. § 521(1).  The schedule 
17 
must disclose, inter alia, "contingent and unliquidated claims of 
every nature" and provide an estimated value for each one.  
Official Forms, Schedule B, App. 41.   
 Once the bankruptcy proceeding is underway, the debtor may 
not solicit approval of a plan of reorganization from a claim-
holder unless "at the time of or before such solicitation, there 
is transmitted to such holder the plan or a summary of the plan, 
and a written disclosure statement approved, after notice and a 
hearing, by the court as containing adequate information."  11 
U.S.C. § 1125(b).  Adequate information is defined as 
information of a kind, and in sufficient detail, as far 
as is reasonably practicable in light of the nature and 
history of the debtor and the condition of the debtor's 
books and records, that would enable a hypothetical 
reasonable investor typical of holders of claims or 
interests of the relevant class to make an informed 
judgment about the plan . . . . 
 
11 U.S.C. § 1125(a).   
 These disclosure requirements are crucial to the effective 
functioning of the federal bankruptcy system.  Because creditors 
and the bankruptcy court rely heavily on the debtor's disclosure 
statement in determining whether to approve a proposed 
reorganization plan, the importance of full and honest disclosure 
cannot be overstated.  See Oneida, 848 F.2d at 417-18. 
B. 
 It is undisputed that by failing to list its claims against 
defendants on its § 521 schedule of assets, Ryan violated these 
statutory duties of full disclosure.  However, this court has 
expressly left open the question of whether such nondisclosure, 
18 
standing alone, can support a finding that a plaintiff has 
asserted inconsistent positions within the meaning of the 
judicial-estoppel doctrine.  Oneida Motor Freight, Inc. v. United 
Jersey Bank, 848 F.2d 414, 419 (3d Cir. 1988)("[W]e stop short of 
finding that . . . [plaintiff's] prior silence is equivalent to 
an acknowledgment that it did not have a claim against the 
bank.").4   We need not decide this issue here, and we decline to 
do so, because we conclude that judicial estoppel would be 
inappropriate in any event as there is no evidence that Ryan 
acted in bad faith.   
 Asserting inconsistent positions does not trigger the 
application of judicial estoppel unless "intentional self-
contradiction is . . . used as a means of obtaining unfair 
advantage."  Scarano, 203 F.2d at 513.  Thus, the doctrine of 
                                                           
4In that case, as here, the plaintiff sought to pursue claims 
that it had failed to disclose on its § 521 schedule of assets in 
a prior bankruptcy proceeding.  Unlike Ryan, however, the 
plaintiff in Oneida had not only failed to disclose its potential 
claim against a bank for $7.7 million as a contingent asset on 
its § 521 schedule of assets and liabilities, but simultaneously 
claimed the corresponding $7.7 million debt to the bank as a 
liability on the same schedule.  Because the plaintiff had 
claimed the debt in the bankruptcy proceeding without disclosing 
the potential offset, we found that the plaintiff's "current suit 
speaks to a position clearly contrary to its Chapter 11 treatment 
of the bank's claim as undisputed."  Id.  As a result, we 
concluded that judicial estoppel was appropriate under the 
circumstances, because "Oneida's failure to list its claim 
against the bank worked in opposition to preservation of the 
integrity of the system which the doctrine of judicial estoppel 
seeks to protect."  Id.   
 In this case, Ryan did not treat the homeowners' claims 
arising from the Ponderosa Pine trim debacle as undisputed; in 
fact, it did not specifically mention those claims at all.  As a 
result, Oneida does not compel a conclusion that Ryan's 
subsequent assertion of those claims was inconsistent with its 
Chapter 11 treatment of them.  
19 
judicial estoppel does not apply "when the prior position was 
taken because of a good faith mistake rather than as part of a 
scheme to mislead the court."  Konstantinidis v. Chen, 626 F.2d 
933, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1980).  An inconsistent argument sufficient 
to invoke judicial estoppel must be attributable to intentional 
wrongdoing.  See Chaveriat v. Williams Pipe Line Co., 11 F.3d 
1420, 1428 (7th Cir. 1993); see also Total Petroleum, Inc. v. 
Davis, 822 F.2d 734 (8th Cir. 1987)(holding that the doctrine 
only applies to deliberate inconsistencies that are "tantamount 
to a knowing misrepresentation to or even fraud on the court.").  
 Defendants contend that in a bankruptcy proceeding, a 
debtor's failure to satisfy its statutory duty of full disclosure 
gives rise to an inference of bad faith sufficient to satisfy the 
requirements of the judicial-estoppel doctrine.  They rely for 
support on our decision in Oneida, in which we applied judicial 
estoppel without an express finding of intentional misconduct. In 
reaching our conclusion that plaintiff's failure to list its 
claims as assets in the underlying Chapter 11 proceeding 
precluded it from asserting them in a post-bankruptcy proceeding, 
we stated that "Oneida's failure to list its claim against the 
bank worked in opposition to preservation of the integrity of the 
judicial system which the doctrine of judicial estoppel seeks to 
protect."  848 F.2d at 419. 
 While we did not expressly analyze plaintiff's intent in 
Oneida, we did not discard that analysis entirely in light of 
plaintiff's affirmative duty of full disclosure under the 
Bankruptcy Code.  On the contrary, there was ample evidence in 
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the record from which an inference of deliberate manipulation 
could be drawn.  Oneida had listed its $7.7 million debt to the 
bank on its schedule of liabilities without mentioning the 
possibility of an offset.  As a result, the creditors as a whole 
had a skewed sense of Oneida's financial condition and no 
knowledge of a claim that could inure to their benefit.  Whereas 
the creditors may have been entitled to the full amount of any 
recovery had they known about the claim in advance, the 
reorganization plan that they approved without knowledge of the 
claim limited their potential recovery to one-third of the 
debtor's gross recovery.  848 F.2d at 416 n.1.  In addition, had 
the bank known that Oneida would subsequently seek restitution of 
the amount paid under the plan, it might well have voted against 
approval of the plan.  848 F.2d at 418.  It is therefore clear 
that Oneida had ample motive to conceal its claim.  Moreover, as 
the gravamen of Oneida's case against the bank was that the 
bank's actions were responsible for forcing Oneida into 
bankruptcy, it is clear that Oneida had knowledge of this 
potential claim at the time it filed for bankruptcy.  This 
combination of knowledge of the claim and motive for concealment 
in the face of an affirmative duty to disclose gave rise to an 
inference of intent sufficient to satisfy the requirements of 
judicial estoppel. 
 In contrast to Oneida, there is no basis in this case for 
inferring that Ryan deliberately asserted inconsistent positions 
in order to gain advantage--i.e., that it played fast and loose 
with the courts.  There is no evidence that the nondisclosure 
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played any role in the confirmation of the plan or that 
disclosure of the potential claims would have led to a different 
result.  Although it may generally be reasonable to assume that a 
debtor who fails to disclose a substantial asset in bankruptcy 
proceedings gains an advantage, the undisputed facts weigh 
against such an inference in this case.  First, Ryan's failure to 
list the instant claims as contingent assets was offset by its 
failure to list the corresponding claims of homeowners against 
Ryan resulting from the allegedly defective wood trim as 
liabilities.  As a result, the balance of assets and liabilities 
before the court and creditors when the reorganization plan was 
approved may have been unaffected by the failure to list the 
claims as assets.  Compare Oneida, 848 F.2d at 418 (finding 
debtor who listed amount owed to creditor as a liability in 
bankruptcy proceeding without any mention of possible offset 
judicially estopped from pursuing post-bankruptcy claim against 
that creditor).  Second, pursuant to the reorganization plan, 
creditors will receive 91 percent of any future recovery on the 
Ponderosa Pine Trim claims, and will suffer 91 percent of the 
loss if Ryan is unable to recover the expenses incurred in the 
repair and replacement program from defendants.  Affidavit of 
Bruce W. Gilchrist, App. 191-92.  Thus, it appears that Ryan 
derived and intended no appreciable benefit from its 
nondisclosure.  Compare Payless Wholesale Distributors, Inc. v. 
Culver, 989 F.2d 570, 571 (1st Cir.)(applying judicial estoppel 
upon finding that plaintiff intended to "[c]onceal [its] claims 
[in bankruptcy proceeding]; get rid of [its] creditors on the 
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cheap; and start over with a bundle of rights"), cert. denied, 
114 S. Ct. 344 (1993).     
 Nor do Ryan's actions subsequent to the filing of its § 521 
schedule support a finding that it sought to conceal the claims 
deliberately.  In an order modifying the automatic stay to allow 
for litigation of "routine claims," the bankruptcy court 
specifically authorized Ryan to pursue "(i) homeowner claims, 
including, but not limited to, warranty claims, . . . [and] (ii) 
claims by or against contractors or suppliers or relating to or 
arising out of the provision of services or materials to the 
Debtors . . . ."  Order (i) Modifying the Automatic Stay to Allow 
Litigation of Routine Claims to Proceed, (ii) Authorizing Debtors 
to Settle Routine Claims, and (iii) Authorizing Debtors to Pay 
Settlement Amounts or Judgments of $15,000 or Less Relating to 
Routine Claims, July 1, 1992, App. 218-19.  Upon receipt of this 
authorization, Ryan filed the instant action during the pendency 
of the bankruptcy proceedings, albeit in a different 
jurisdiction.  Ryan then submitted fee requests to the bankruptcy 
court detailing, among other things, counsel's work in the 
Ponderosa Pine Trim litigation, which the bankruptcy court 
reviewed and approved for payment.  App. 231-40.  Finally, the 
reorganization plan that the court and creditors approved 
authorized Ryan to retain and enforce claims against any entity 
and to adjudicate homeowner claims.  Second Amended Joint Plan of 
Reorganization, §§ 4.09 & 7.02, App. 86 & 92.  While none of 
these facts standing alone is sufficient to substitute for 
disclosure under § 521, in combination they preclude a finding 
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that Ryan deliberately concealed its claims against defendants 
from the bankruptcy court or otherwise sought to "obtain . . . 
unfair advantage."  Scarano, 203 F.2d at 513.5    
 We note in addition that while plaintiff cites district 
court decisions from various jurisdictions that support its 
position,6 defendant cites no case in which a court held that 
intent to mislead or deceive could be inferred from the mere fact 
of nondisclosure, and we are aware of none.  We are persuaded, 
however, that policy considerations militate against adopting a 
rule that the requisite intent for judicial estoppel can be 
                                                           
5Defendants cite several district court cases from other 
jurisdictions in support of their position that a debtor's 
failure to disclose a claim as an asset in bankruptcy precludes 
later assertion of that claim under the doctrine of judicial 
estoppel. See Pako Corp. v. Citytrust, 109 B.R. 368 (D. Minn. 
1989); In re Hoffman, 99 B.R. 929 (N.D. Iowa 1989); In re Louden, 
106 B.R. 109 (E.D. Ky. 1989); In re Galerie des Monnaies, 62 B.R. 
224 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd, 1986 WL 6230 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); In re 
Caro Area Services for the Handicapped, 53 B.R. 438 (E.D. Mi. 
1985).  Several of these cases are clearly distinguishable from 
the instant case. See, e.g., Pako, 109 B.R. at 377 (finding that 
debtor knowingly concealed claim in light of pre-bankruptcy 
testimony of General Counsel/Chief Administrative Officer that he 
thought debtor had been wronged by defendant).  To the extent 
that some are not, we note simply that these cases are not 
binding on this court, and we are not persuaded by their 
analysis. 
6See Guenther v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 1995 WL 137061, *11 (N.D. 
Ill. 1995)(unreported decision)(holding that judicial estoppel on 
the basis of bankruptcy nondisclosure is inappropriate because 
"there is no basis for finding any misconduct or injustice"); In 
re TGX Corp., 168 B.R. 122, 132 (W.D. La. 1994)(finding 
nondisclosures "not sufficiently egregious" to justify judicial 
estoppel); Reciprocal Merchandising Services, Inc. v. All 
Advertising Associates, Inc., 163 B.R. 689, 697 n.11 (S.D.N.Y. 
1994)(finding that "intentional misconduct is a necessary element 
in a claim for judicial estoppel" even in bankruptcy context); In 
re Neptune World Wide Moving, Inc., 111 B.R. 457 (S.D.N.Y. 
1990)(stating that judicial estoppel does not apply where 
inconsistency was based on inadvertence or mistake). 
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inferred from the mere fact of nondisclosure in a bankruptcy 
proceeding.  Such a rule would unduly expand the reach of 
judicial estoppel in post-bankruptcy proceedings and would 
inevitably result in the preclusion of viable claims on the basis 
of inadvertent or good-faith inconsistencies.  While we by no 
means denigrate the importance of full disclosure or condone 
nondisclosure in bankruptcy proceedings, we are unwilling to 
treat careless or inadvertent nondisclosures as equivalent to 
deliberate manipulation when administering the "strong medicine" 
of judicial estoppel.  Chaveriat v. Williams Pipe Line Co., 11 
F.3d 1420, 1428 (7th Cir. 1993).   
 Defendants argue that rejecting their proposed "inferred 
intent" rule "would invite prolonged discovery into the motives 
of the debtor."  Bright Wood's Br. at 25.  We disagree.  For 
purposes of judicial estoppel, we require a showing of intent in 
other contexts; we see no reason why the process of discerning 
that intent should be unworkable in the bankruptcy context when 
it is workable elsewhere.  We therefore reject defendant's 
argument that intent may be inferred for purposes of judicial 
estoppel solely from nondisclosure notwithstanding the 
affirmative disclosure requirement of the Bankruptcy Code.   
 Because Ryan did not act with the intent to play fast and 
loose with the courts that is required for application of the 
judicial-estoppel doctrine, we conclude that the district court 
erred in granting summary judgment against Ryan on judicial 
estoppel grounds. 
VIII. 
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 As we have already concluded that the district court erred 
in granting summary judgment against Ryan on judicial estoppel 
grounds, we need not reach Ryan's argument that application of 
judicial estoppel under the circumstances of this case would 
violate principles of equity and justice.  We nonetheless state 
briefly our belief that judicial estoppel is an "extraordinary 
remed[y] to be invoked when a party's inconsistent behavior will 
otherwise result in a miscarriage of justice."  Oneida, 848 F.2d 
at 424 (Stapleton, J., dissenting).  It is not meant to be a 
technical defense for litigants seeking to derail potentially 
meritorious claims, especially when the alleged inconsistency is 
insignificant at best and there is no evidence of intent to 
manipulate or mislead the courts.  Judicial estoppel is not a 
sword to be wielded by adversaries unless such tactics are 
necessary to "secure substantial equity."  Gleason, 458 F.2d at 
175.  In this case, application of judicial estoppel would be 
unduly harsh and inequitable.  While we need not and do not 
decide whether we would reverse the district court's order on 
this ground alone, our equitable concerns lend support to our 
overall conclusion.  
IX. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the order of the 
district court granting summary judgment in favor of defendants 
and remand for further proceedings. 
